shall develop shares with the Cartesian dualist the claim that persons are not identical to their bodies (I could have a different body from the one that I do have), and it shares with the classical materialist the claim that, necessarily, human persons are embodied. After setting out this Constitution View, I shall turn to the metaphysics of resurrection.
First, let me comment on the term "human being". Some philosophers use "human being" to denote a biological kind. 3 Others use it to denote a partly psychological kind. 4 I use "human being" in the latter way, to name a partly psychological kind, a human person.
All human persons are human beings, and vice versa.
The Constitution View of Human Persons
What makes a human person a person is having what I'll call a 'first-person perspective.' What makes a human person a human is being constituted by a human body.
A first-person perspective is the defining characteristic of all persons, human or not. 5 From a (robust) first-person point of view, one can think about oneself as oneself and think about one's thoughts as one's own. In English, we not only use first-person pronouns to refer to ourselves 'from the inside' so to speak (e.g., 'I'm happy') but also to attribute to ourselves first-person reference (e.g., 'I wonder whether I'll be happy in 10 years'). The second occurrence of "I" in 'I wonder whether I'll be happy in 10 years' directs attention to the person per se, without recourse to any name, description or other third-person referential device to identify who is being thought about.
The first-person perspective opens up a distinction between thinking of oneself in the first-person and thinking of oneself in the thirdperson. Once someone can make this distinction, she can think of herself as a subject in a world of things different from herself. And since human persons are necessarily embodied, a person can think of her body, as well as her thoughts, from her first-person perspective.
A being may be conscious without having a first-person perspective. Nonhuman primates and other higher animals are conscious, and they have psychological states like believing, fearing and desiring. They have points of view (e.g., 'danger in that direction'), but they cannot conceive of themselves as the subjects of such thoughts. They can not conceive of themselves from the firstperson. (We have every reason to think that they do not wonder how they will die.) So, being conscious, having psychological states like beliefs and desires, and having a point of view are not sufficient conditions for being a person.
To be a person-whether God, an angel, a human person, or a Human persons differ from nonbodily or immaterial persons (if there are any) in that human persons are not just pure subjects; they do not exist unembodied. So, myself includes my body. And persons' bodies are the objects of first-person reference. If Smith wonders whether she has cancer, she is wondering about her body from a firstperson perspective. She is not wondering whether there is a 6 malignant tumor in some particular body identified by a third-person demonstrative pronoun or description; she is wondering whether there is a malignant tumor in her own body, considered as herself. This is different from wondering about a material possession, say. If
Smith wonders whether her car will run, she wonders about a particular car, which she identifies by a description or a third-person demonstrative reference. Without a third-person way to think about the car, she could not wonder about its battery. But if Smith is wondering how she will die, she can think of her body as her own without recourse to any name or description or second-or thirdperson demonstrative pronoun. And reference without recourse to the familiar third-person devices is the mark of first-person reference. So, what makes a particular body Smith's, rather than someone else's, is that it is the body that Smith can think of and refer to in a first-person way, 'from the inside.' The body to which Smith has a first-person relation is the body some of whose parts she (normally) can move without moving anything else, the body that she tends when she is in pain, and the body that expresses her intentional states.
States like pain, longing, sadness, hope, fear, frustration, worry, effort, and joy as well as states like believing, desiring, and intending are expressed through posture, facial expression, sounds and other bodily motions.
The body that expresses Smith's intentional states is the body to which Smith has a first-person relation. Smith's first-person relation to her body at t does not imply that Smith is actually thinking of her body at t; indeed, Smith may believe at t that she is disembodied. The body to which Smith has a first-person relation is the body whose sweaty hands manifest the fact that Smith is nervous, and the body whose stomach's being tied in knots expresses the fact that Smith is frightened, or the body that would move if Smith carried out her decision to leave the room. Smith's body at time t distinguishes Smith from all other persons at t. What distinguishes me now from all other coexisting persons-even physical and psychological replicas of me, if there are any-is that at this time, I have a first-person relation to this body and to no other; and any replica of me at this time has a first-person relation to some other body, but not to this one. Homo sapiens. What makes something a human body are its biological properties; its career may be followed from beginning to end without respect to whether or not it is any person's body.
Similarly, its persistence conditions are independent of whether or not it is any person's body. The identity of a human body is independent of whether it is Smith's or any other person's body.
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In the natural course of things, our organic bodies undergo full atomic replacement over some years, and we persons survive this total replacement without interruption in mental functioning. It seems possible that we could equally survive gradual replacement of organic cells by bionic cells-until finally the body that sustains us is no longer an organic body. Exactly how much replacement of parts a human body may undergo and still remain a human body is somewhat vague, but if a body is mostly made up of inorganic material and is not sustained by organic processes, it is not a member of the species Homo Sapiens. The nonorganic body that ends up constituting Smith now is a different body from the organic body that was a member of the species Homo Sapiens.
Consider the organic body that Smith was born with. Call it "OB". Suppose that the organs of OB were totally replaced over a period of time by bionic parts, until what remained was a fully bionic, nonbiological body that resembled OB in appearance, that moved in ways indistinguishable from OB, that emitted sounds that we took to be English sentences that reported memories of things that had happened to Smith, and indeed that we took to be professions that this person was Smith. Is the bionic body the same body as Smith's biological body OB? No. OB was a carbon-based body that was a member of the species Homo Sapiens. The bionic body is not a member of any biological species. Would Smith still exist? Of course.
Otherwise Smith's possessions and property should be taken from the bionic-body-Smith and distributed to Smith's heirs. After the organ replacement, Smith would still exist but would no longer by constituted by OB; rather, Smith would be constituted by a bionic body. (I really do not like bizarre thought experiments, but I think that we are actually close to bringing this thought experiment to fruition. There are now devices implanted in brains that allow paralyzed people to operate computers by their thoughts; cochlear implants allow deaf people to "hear"; and so on. Moreover, it's easy to imagine billionaires' seeking 'whole-body' replacements to prevent aging.)
The point is that this is a realistic example that shows that a single person may be constituted by different bodies at different times: Smith had a first-person relation to a biological body at one time, and to a bionic body at a later time, and a biological body is essentially organic, and is not numerically identical to any bionic body.
Note that spatiotemporal continuity in general does not signal sameness of entity: Very slowly atoms could be added or taken away from Smith's biological body until it was indistinguishable from a turnip or a bookcase. In that case, it would no longer be the same body, and presumably Smith would no longer be with us. Indeed, there may be a period of time during which it is indeterminate whether there is a human body or not. I have argued elsewhere that everything that we encounter in the natural world comes into existence gradually; hence, everything that we interact with has vague temporal boundaries. Thomism takes over Aristotle's notion of a human being as a substance for which the body supplies the matter and the soul supplies the form. According to Thomas, then, a human being is a composite of a rational soul (form) and a body (matter). The human being is a substance; the rational soul is not-it is a substantial form that nonetheless can 'subsist' on its own. Before the general The second difficulty is how to individuate disembodied souls.
In the case of Immaterialism, we could appeal to haecceities, because according to Immaterialism, the soul itself is a substance. But according to Thomas, the soul is not a substance. Disembodied souls are individuated by the bodies that they long for and desire to be reunited with. Smith's soul is the one that longs for and desires reunion with a certain body. But what makes a body (mere potency, the matter of which the soul is the form) the body that Smith's soul longs for? It can only be that Smith's soul longs for 'it'. But since the body is mere potency, there is no 'it' for Smith's soul to long for. At death, God will remember the patterns and 'its instantiation will be recreated by him' when at the resurrection. A cannot be identical with two distinct objects, and it would be arbitrary to suppose that A is identical to one but not the other.
Identity is a one-one relation, but person A's (quasi-)memories, software, information-bearing pattern, etc., could be transferred to more than one person. So, sameness of (quasi-)memories, software, or information-bearing pattern cannot suffice for sameness of person.
To avoid this problem, defenders of the Memory Criterion and the like usually add the (ad hoc) requirement that there be no duplication. 
